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I HE QUESTION of whether or not the economy
entered into a period of recession in 1974 has been
a popular topic of discussion, To date the National
Bureau of Economic Research, unofficially charged
with making the distinction, sees the controversy as
too close to call. Bnmt, the issue of tagging 1974 with
the label of “recession” is, by itself, of little signifi-
cance. What is important is the common interpreta-
tion of what a period of recession means in terms of
economic activity and the monetary and fiscal policies
that are appropriate to deal with the situation.
Economic stabilization policy has
comae to be concerned primarily with
influencing the growth of aggregate
demand as a means of achieving em-
ployment and price goals. While not
universal, the belief is widely held that
judicious actions can keep demand
growing in line with productive capac-
ity and thereby minimize fluctuations
in unemployment and maintain price
stability. As a result, economic reces-
sions and the associated increases in
the rate of unemployment have been
attacked through programs designed to
stimulate growth of demand. The rele-
vant question currently is what could
have been done, in terms of influencing
the growth of aggregate demand, to
forestall the developments of 1974 and
what programs are now appropriate.
Sou.rces of the Problem 1Q74
In many obvious ways the pattern of economic
activity in 1974 has been much like that of prior
recessions. Total production has fallen in each quarter,
demand has weakened in several sectors, and the
rate of unemploynment is rising. There are some sig-
nificant differences, hosvever, such as the continued
growth of total employment through most of the year
and the sharp acceleration in the rate of price in-
crease. The table below reports the rates of change
of prices, production, and employment in each of the
five official recessions since 1947 and the immediately
prior years. The experiences of 1973 and 1974 are
shown for contrast. Employment typically declined in
the post-war recessions and, while the average level of
prices did not generally fall during these prior periods,
the rate of increase has tended to decrease sub-
stantially or at least to cease accelerating.1
Table 1
$ELEC~EDMEASUR S OF ECONOMK ACTIVTY
Rate of Change Ove th Year Poor to Each Recessoon
OMP aMP Civilaoro
ON? 1958 Pr o) deflator Employmetif
1947 IV 1948/fV 90% 4.5% 4.3% 1.2%
1952/fIt 1953 ft 58 50 08 18
1956/Ill 1957 Ut 6-I 24 36 0
1959 ff1960/lI 37 2.0 16 20
1968/tV 1959 [V 66 .2 53 27
1972/[V1973,IV 116 39 74 38
Annual Rate of Change Dunng PerIods of Recessoan
ON? ON? Coy foot,
ONP (1958 PrIces) deflator mpfoyn,ent
1948 fV-1949 IV 34% 16% 1 8% 14%
1953/UI 1954 Ill 03 16 12 2.0
1957 [-1958/lI 24 46 23 3.0
960/ [-1942/ I 03 1.9 1 7 07
l969/IV 1970 [V 45 08 £3 00
1973 IV 1974/In 71 36 11.1 11
Etao char fomlOeItolt4S/W.
Cyclical variations in employment typically are not a great
as output fluctuatmons. Th costs of releas’ng and hiring
workers can be sub tantial, and busmne sstend to maintain
the r work force through the early stages of an cononsie
downturn and are reluctant to increa e employm at a the
reco~ cry begEns. The result is that “output per man hour’
In the economy shows a pro cyclical pattern falling during
reces ion and ni ing in th arly stage of e pan on. Fhe
sharp decrease in output this year coupi d with the cob -
t’uued growth of employment ha resultcd in an abuomoall~
rapid decrea e in this mea ure of labor productivity.
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These differences are related to the major element
which distinguishes the experience of 1974 from the
five recessions of the post-war period. Each of the
five recessions between 1947 and 1971 resulted exclu-
sively from a restriction of the growth of aggregate
demand. Compared to these periods, however, growth
of aggregate demand slowed only moderately in 1974,
with total spending growth falling to an annual rate
of 7.1 percent for the first three quarters of the year
from an 11.6 percent increase over the prior year.
Interpreting the growth of total spending as indica-
tive of the rate of expansion of aggregate demand, a
reduction of this magnitude is not sufficient to ex-
plain the decrease in the rate of production experi-
enced so far this year.
Over the period from 1953 to 1971 a historical rela-
tionship between monetary and fiscal policy actions on
the one hand and the growth of total real output in
the economy on the other wonld imply an output
growth at about a 2.5 percent annnal rate over the
first three quarters of 1974.2 While this empirical re-
lationship does not provide a basis for predicting all
of the quarterly variation in output over a period, the
differences between the reported rate of growth of
output in 1974 and the change in output that is im-
plied by past relationships is sufficiently large to
warrant a look towards “special factors” that nmay
have played a part in this abnormal development.
fl-~P, OtfC U/ /./rwew.l. toctors
As far as the production of goods and services
goes, the events of the past few years seem to confirm
the validity of Murphy’s Law, which essentially pre-
dicts that in a given situation anything that can go
wrong will. The economy has been buffeted by an
unprecedented assortment of so-called outside influ-
ences. Many of the events would not pose serious
problems if they occurred separately; but occurring
almost simultaneously, the effect has been substantial
2
There are many empirical models which attempt to capture
the relationship between monetary and fiscal actions and
measures of economic activity. The results reported here are
from only one such model and others might give different
results. A crude indication of the predictions of these other
models can be obtained by averaging the forecasted rates of
output change from several models for the first three quar-
ters of 1974. In December 1973, a representative sample of
these models predicted, on average, that the rate of increase
of real product would be at a 1.2 percent annual rate. See
The Conference Board Statistical Bulletin (December 1973),
p. 5. For a presentation of the snodcl used here see Leonall
C. Andersen and Denis S. Karnosky, “The Appropriate Time
Frame for Controlling Monetary Aggregates: ‘I’he St. Louis
Evidence,” Controlling Monetary Aggregates II: The Imple-
mentation, Conference Series No. 9, Federal Resen’e Bank of
Boston, 1972, pp. 147-177.
indeed. The problems have been made even more
severe by current and past price controls and govern-
tnent allocation programs.
The weather both here and abroad resulted in
widespread crop losses and intense pressure in our
agricultural markets. This was worsened by the mys-
terious disappearance of anchovies (a prime source
of protein) from the Peruvian coast. The dollar has
depreciated by a weighted average of 15 percent
against the ten major world currencies. New environ-
mental laws were implemented in order to reduce
air, water, and noise pollution. Occupational and prod-
uct safety laws were pressed. Major oil-exporting
countries colluded first to impose a partial embargo
on exports of petroleum to the United States and then
to increase sharply prices for crude and refined oil
products. Each of these events represents a substan-
tial and unforeseen shock to the economy. Whatever
the long-term benefits of any of these actions, all have
led to substantial increases in the cost of producing
sonme goods and services, at least in the short-run.
This increase in cost is responsible for much of the
decline in production experienced in 1974.
There have been instances in the past, such as in
the case of major labor strikes, when the output of
the economy has been cut sharply, but the effect has
tended to be very short-lived and quickly reversed.
During the period of a major strike, machinery and
workers, both capable of producing goods and serv-
ices, are voluntarily idle. The willingness of the con-
cerned businesses and workers to produce is de-
creased. When the strike is settled, employment of
machinery and workers is resumed and production
begins anew. The situation in 1974 is similar, ex-
cept the problem is not omme of labor-business in-
transigence, and the consequences are much more
pervasive. The rate of output in the economy has
been decreased markedly and prices are sharply higher
as a result.
The effects of some of these special factors are
short-lived, while others threaten to last for some
time. Many of the factors which have tended in some
way to depress output and increase domestic prices
are interimational in nature, related to the interde-
pendence of world economies. Domestic developments
have also contributed to the problem, either as sources
of additional stress or as agents which magnify the
effects of foreign influences. The effect of these fac-
tors in the last three years has been to intensify the
internal stress in an economy already taut under the
pressure of persistent excessive aggregate demand.
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In a market system resources flow back and forth
in pursuit of the highest expected rewards. In an ideal
setting there is a general wealth of information about
production opportunities and there are no impedi-
ments to movements of capital, labor, and technology
between markets. In fact, however, the structure of
the economy is very rigid in many respects and re-
source movements often are impeded in the short run.
Actions once taken are costly to reverse. Because of
these costs, shifts in demand in the economy can re-
sult in temporary, hut often long-lasting, distortions
in economic activity, with increased unemployment in
some industries and excess demand for labor in others.
Machinery designed to produce one comnmodity is not
easily converted to the production of another. Workers
cannot be re-employed quickly in different profes-
sions or in other parts of the country. The economy
is continuously subjected to such structural problems,
but for the most part the system has been able, at
least until the past few years, to handle the normal,
frequent shifts of resources without exceptionally large
economic distortions.
Costs of adjusting to shifts in demand have a bear-
ing on the productive capacity of the economy, at
least in the short-run. For example, with a given
growth rate of aggregate demand, a shift imi the pub-
lic’s preference from defense to nondefense goods,
say from military aircraft to cosmetics, does not affect
the ability of the existing machinery and labor to
produce aircraft. There will be less aircraft produced,
however, as the incentive of the aircraft manufacturers
to produce is cut. There is less demand for their
product at current prices. Unless there is idle capac-
ity in the cosmetic industry, the increase in output
of cosmetics would not be as great as the increase
in demand, as resources are not attracted immediately
into the industry. For some period of time, time econ-
omy suffers a decrease in total production, manifested
in the aircraft industry, but notfullyoffset by increased
production of cosmetics. In an engineering sense the
productive capacity of the economy is unaffected.
Technically, the economy would still be able to pro-
duce as many aircraft as before. Economic capacity is
reduced, however, because the incentive to produce
airplanes has fallen. Fewer aircraft could then be
produced at a price which covers costs. In an ceo-
nomic sense, a portion of the productive facilities of
the aircraft industry become obsolete.
It is clear that the sharp restriction on oil importa-
tion last winter accounted for much of the economic
problems early in the year. The reduction in the sup-
ply of petroleum products caused many forms of
economic activity to be curtailed and the total output
of the United States decreased sharply. The embargo
ended in March, but, while the flow of oil into the
country resunmed, the depressive effect on economic
activity continued. The consumption of oil is now
growing at a slower rate than prior to the embargo,
due to the formation of a cartel among oil exporting
countries and markedly higher price. It is the increase
in the price of oil which now contributes to our
problems.
Machinery which required petroleum products in
the production process and which could be run effi-
ciently at a crude oil price of $2.50 a barrel can be-
come less efficient, or even obsolete, when the price of
oil goes up to $10 a barrel. Alternatively, the most
efficient uses of oil cimange when the price rises, and
substitutes for oil, which were more expensive to use
when oil was available at the old price, become more
efficient in use. The adjustment to this change in rela-
tive prices cannot be accomplished quickly, however,
and in the interim the productive capacity of the
system is decreased.
Petroleum products are now more expensive in
terms of other goods and services. On the one hand
the United States must now give up more commodi-
ties to purchase oil from the cartel — if not now, then
at some time in the future. Domestically, it is no
longer efficient to use oil in the same ways as in the
past. Intermmal adjustments are required. Just as the old
patterns of activity nmust be altered because they are
inconsistent with public demand for cleaner air and
water, a safer working environnment, and increased
product reliability and safety, the way in which we
have done many things has been made obsolete by
the actions and threats of time cartel of oil-exporting
countries. At the new, higher oil prices many of the
ways tlmat petroleum products had been used prior
to the embargo have become wasteful.
This effect is most apparent in time automotive in-
dustry, where sales are down sharply. The industry
typically suffers a sales slump when growth of aggre-
gate denmand slows, but the current problems can be
tiaced imm large part to structural difficulties. Late in
1973 and early this year the oil embargo, rising gaso-
line prices, and government fuel allocation programs
increased the attractiveness of small cars relative to
large automobiles. Total auto production decreased,
however, because of the costs and time necessary for
producers to alter their operations to meet this shift
in consunmer preference. In addition, the demand for
cars in general has been decreased by the increase in
Page 17FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS DECEMBER 1974
the cost of operation, moot just fronm higimer fuel and oil
prices but also by the additional costs of safety and
environmental devices. TIme problem in the automo-
tive industry is miot one of inadequate aggregate de-
mand, but instead reflects the effects of shifts in
demand within the economy.
The impact of the changed oil situation and the
environmental and otimer la\vs has been intensified in
the economy by other restrictions which inhibit the
movement of resources. Information about production
opportunities are transmitted via relative price
changes. Price increases in an industry serve as a
signal that there might exist an opportunity for gain-
all employment in that industry. The normal adjust-
ment mechanism was short-circuited in 1971, how-
ever, by the impiememmtation of price controls, on both
goods and labor services. The sudden and wide-
spread reports of “shortages” of many items are ample
evidence of the distortions created by the controls,
The effects on total production of sudden simifts
in denmand will1 tend to he temnporary and, without
further attempts to control prices or allocate re-
sources, time adjustmemmt will proceed until total pro-
duction is restored. In additiomm to the tenmporamy
effects on current production of adjustment to ex-
traneous shocks, the economy’s ability to produce
has been reduced permanently, to some extent. Some
environmental eommtrois have rendered existing pro-
ductive processes and equipment obsolete. Time
external quadrupling of oil prices, combined witim the
price controls and mandatory allocation programs ap-
plied to domestic oil, ultimately reduced the amount
of oil available for domestic production. The depre-
ciation of the dollar in international markets from
artificially imigh rates imas decreased the anmoummt of
productive resources that have been previously ac-
qured through imports. Thus we imad miot only a
temporary decrease in the wealth of time country, btmt
also a permanent one.
Si.tmm.w-y
Given such increases iim the prices at which produc-
tive resources are available, it is not surprising that a
sharp decline in output and an acceleratiomm is-s the in-
crease of the price level resulted. This, of course,
explains neither the rate of infiatiosm that existed prior
to 1973 nor a dechmme of output growth that would
have resulted fronm the effects of price and wage con-
trols. But a large part of the sharp changes that oc-
curred in 1974 can be attributed to exogenously imm-
duced resource losses.
Timis being the case, traditional stabilization poheies
designed to stimulate aggregate demand are likely
to produce even further accelerating inflation without
stirnuiatiimg output growth. It seems reasonable that
the adjustments to internal stresses and to the de-
crease in available resources are coming to an end
and that, even without any new and clifferent stabili-
zation policies, umflatiomm will return to the path dic-
tated by the growth in output and immommey stock;
output growtim, in turn, will return to time path pro-
duced by the growth of resources and technology.
One thing that no aggregate demand policy will he
able to wipe out is time fact that these exogenous
shocks imave mmmacie us poorer: the output level will
remain below, and the price level \viill renmain above
wimat it would hay-c been in the abseimee of these
resource losses.
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